“A deep, drawn-out recession, triggered by war with Russian-backed forces in the wake of a popular revolt in early 2014, began to subside from mid-2015. At the start of 2016 Ukraine’s « deep and comprehensive » free-trade deal with the EU came into force, but was met with further economic retaliation by the Kremlin. Alongside the emergence of serious domestic political divisions over constitutional and anti-corruption reform, this means that economic recovery may be postponed until 2017.” – The Economist, Intelligence Unit
Background: Ukraine’s path 1938-2015
Source: The Economist
– Though Ukraine became independent when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it remained largely dependent on Moscow in the ensuing decades.
– The Orange Revolution in 2004 promised new beginnings. But the post-revolutionary government ultimately succumbed to infighting and scandals, paving the way for Viktor Yanukovych, who won the presidency in 2010. Mr Yanukovych’s rampant corruption and his failure to deliver on a promise to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union brought demonstrators to the streets again in late 2013.
– In late 2013, pro-Western protests became the Maidan revolution, which ended with Mr Yanukovych fleeing in February 2014. Russia responded by swiftly annexing Crimea (where it still had a significant naval base) and stoking a separatist war in Ukraine’s east. The ensuing crisis has left thousands dead and displaced millions more.
–> major cultural divide: The east and south are primarily Russian-speaking and prone to Soviet nostalgia, tend to favour closer ties with Russia. Ukraine’s west, parts of which belonged to Poland until the second world war, is mostly Ukrainian-speaking and inclined towards integration with the European Union.
Economic and financial overview
Source: Coface, January 2016
Monetary policy
Mandate of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU): “The priority of monetary policy is defined as the achievement and maintenance of price stability in the country. This Law also defines price stability as retention of the purchasing power of the national currency by maintaining low and stable rates of inflation measured by the Consumer Price Index over the medium term perspective (from 3 to 5 years).” – BNU
The central bank of Ukraine left its benchmark interest rate on hold at 22 % on 28 January 2016 in order to ensure price stability and achieve the inflation rate target of 12 % by the end of 2016. In the future, provided that the disinflationary trend remains, inflationary expectations improve, primarily due to stabilization of the global commodity markets, the National Bank may resume the gradual easing of monetary policy.
Ukraine Interest Rates
Interest Rate in Ukraine averaged 42.21 %from 1992 until 2015, reaching an all time high of 300 % in October of 1994 and a record low of 6.50 % in August of 2013.
–> In the recent period, the NBU has sharply raised interest rates in an effort to curb inflation and prop up its beleaguered currency.
Evolution of the USD vs the Ukrainian currency (hryvnia: UAH)
Source: Bloomberg, February 18th 2016
Ukrainian stock market
According to the MSCI classification, Ukraine belongs to the MSCI Standalone Market Indexes. The MSCI Ukraine Index was deleted from the MSCI Frontier Markets Index in August 2015 due to liquidity concerns caused by the introduction of capital controls by the NBU on March 3rd 2015.
The biggest stock exchange is the PFTS Stock Exchange, based in Kiev.
PTFS components and weightings
Evolution of the Ukrainian stock market (PTFS Index)
1: 21/11/2013: A prolonged crisis in Ukraine began when then-president Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union. This decision resulted in mass protests by its proponents, known as the « Euromaidan ».
2: 18/02/2014: Between February 18th and 20th, Kiev fell into violence. 80 fatalities in the capital city.
3: 18/03/2014: Annexation of Crimea by Russia
4: 25/05/2014: Petro Porochenko, former minister, was elected President after the first round of the election
5: 17/07/2014: Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 crashed after being shot down, killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew on board. According to Western intelligence sources, the plane was mistakenly shot down by pro-Russian insurgents using a surface-to-air missile fired from the territory which they controlled
6: 26/10/2014: Pro-European parties win the Ukrainian parliamentary election
7: 22/05/2015: EU provided a EUR 1.8 bn loan to Ukraine
8: 01/01/2016: Entry into force of the Free Trade Agreement between EU and Ukraine
CDS premia Ukraine:
This chart clearly illustrates the rising distrust of investors concerning Ukraine’s ability to repay its debt during the Ukrainian crisis. Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are instruments that can be used to insure debt against nonpayment. Ukraine 5-year CDS traded below 500 bp in 2011, meaning it cost less than USD 500 k annually to insure USD 10 M of Ukraine government debt for five years. This spread jumped to more than 4000 bp at the beginning of 2015 – equivalent to a + USD 4 M annual premium.
Risks and opportunities
Over the recent period, Ukraine has been an interesting playground for investors.
In Ukraine, Franklin Templeton was not very lucky. Fund Manager Michael Hasenstabd, famous for making calls that go against prevailing market sentiment, found himself the country’s biggest investor in 2014, owning about 40% of outstanding bonds at one time. In August 2015, Templeton and three other funds agreed to write off 20% of the value of Ukrainian Eurobonds. It gave Ukrainian Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko the losses she wanted to impose on creditors, but also compensated them with coupon payments and warrants tied to economic growth. Hasenstab is still keen on Ukraine and the experience hasn’t damped his appetite for risky debt.
As we see on the following chart, Ukrainian bonds lost about half their value after Templeton added to holdings.
Current Strengths & Weaknesses::
+ Strategic position between Russia and the EU
+ Great agricultural potential
+ Qualified and inexpensive labour
(+ elegant and charming girls)
– High degree of tension with Russia and inter-regional tensions threatening the integrity of the country
– Low economic diversification and dependency on the prices of metals and the price of imported gas
– Excessive borrowing in the private sector and rapid increase in public indebtedness
– Banking system seriously weakened by bad debt and lack of liquidity
Time for risky bets? A country at a vital crossroad
Current political and economic situation (Coface)
- Political situation
Poroshenko was elected in the first round of the Presidential elections in May 2014, held following the dismissal of V. Yanukovych triggered by the protest movements that erupted at the end of 2013. The two pro-western parties (the Bloc Petro Poroshenko-BPP and People’s Front-NF, party of the Prime Minister A. Yatsenyuk) have a majority of seats in parliament. However, differences within the government coalition, consisting of five pro-European parties, are leading to concerns about its longevity. The BPP won the local elections in October 2015 for which the NF, lacking sufficient public support had not presented any candidate. Social discontent is growing in the face of the significantly worsening economic situation and the overly slow pace of the reforms, particularly those fighting corruption. Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk still faces an uphill battle to push through reforms required to secure more money from a $40 billion international aid package. His economy minister resigned at the start of February, complaining that corrupt vested interests were meddling in his ministry’s work. In the east, the Minsk II agreement, signed at the beginning of 2015, helped diminish the intensity of fighting between the Ukrainian army and the pro-Russian separatist movements. The situation remains nonetheless resolutely unstable, overshadowed by the constant fear of a sudden escalation.
- Economic situation
Industrial activity is expected to remain very limited in 2016, as a result of the loss of the production and export capacities located in the two separatist provinces in the east (Donetsk and Lugansk), where a large percentage of the country’s steel production facilities and coal mines are concentrated. Agricultural production (maize, wheat) could suffer as a result of the drought that hit the country at the end of 2015. In addition, household consumption is likely to remain shackled by the highly restrictive budget policy, rapid inflation and, as with investment, by the prohibitive cost of credit (22% in November 2015). The decline in agricultural production is also likely to limit any increase in exports, which is therefore unlikely to make any positive contribution to GDP in 2016.
Consumer prices are expected to continue rising in 2016, but less strongly than in 2015, as a result of the slowing in energy (gas) price rises and the depreciation of the hryvnia against the dollar. Inflationary dangers remain significant and will thus limit any chances of substantial cuts to interest rates.
An extremely precarious financial situation despite improving public finances
Budget revenues are likely to be held in check by the weakness in economic activity, despite the rise in taxes (tobacco, alcohol, fuel) agreed in the 2016 budget. The government will also have to continue supporting Naftogas, the gas company struggling because of the accumulated arrears owed to its Russian supplier, Gazprom. The severe measures implemented to control spending (lower spending, particularly social and reduced energy subsidies) should, however, help bring the deficit down in 2016. The public debt should remain above 90% of GDP in 2016.
The improvements to the current account deficit should continue in 2016, without any significant recovery in imports. Exports, however, are once again likely to be held in check by the slow growth of production and the prices of leading export products (steel, coal, agricultural raw materials).
Despite the increase in 2015, linked with the IMF aid payment, currency reserves remain low (barely 3 months’ imports) and access to capital markets almost non-existent, for either the State or companies and banks. An agreement signed in October 2015 includes a 20% reduction in the sovereign debt held by private creditors (3.6 billion out of a total of USD 18 billion) and the rescheduling of the balance. The USD 3 billion Eurobond subscribed by Russia late 2013 hasn’t been included in this agreement and Ukraine didn’t pay the bond on due date (December 20). This default on an “official” debt, doesn’t affect IMF aid payments, given the change, agreed mid-December, in rules preventing any IMF support for countries in arrears on official loans. Whereas t its rescheduling proposal (over 3 years without any reduction in the debt) has been rejected by Kiev, Moscow may bring the case to court. Exchange controls, together with a degree of calm in the Eastern regions, allowed the hryvnia to achieve relative stability as of March 2015. Downward pressures are expected to diminish in 2016. However, further depreciation cannot be ruled out, in particular if there is any deterioration in the political situation. It would further increase the public debt (60% denominated in currencies), as well as those of companies and banks, both saddled with large currency debts.
The banking system is extremely fragile and inadequately capitalised, with a level of non-performing loans of around 40%.
–> Ukraine is at vital crossroad, the current political situation is perhaps an ideal for the implementation of reforms.
The need for structural reforms
- Tax reform
There are 23 taxes and contributions, 18 of which are national and 5 local. The main taxes in Ukraine are the following: Corporate Income Tax (2.7% of GDP); Value-Added Tax (10% of GDP); Personal Income Tax (5.3% of GDP), Single Social tax which is going to social security fund.
–> decrease in the number of taxes, harmonization of tax reporting according to international standards, introduction of the new system of VAT administration.
–> The aim of these planed changes is to increase cost effectiveness of tax administration.
–> Legalization of salary is expected to happen using two ways: reduction of the rate of Single social tax from 41% to 15% + increase of sanctions, including administrative and criminal ones, against “out of pocket” salary payment.
- Improvement of Economic freedom
According to the 2015 Index of Economic Freedom provided by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation, Ukraine’s economy holds the 162nd position in the 2015 Index among 185 countries of the world. A rigid labor market and bureaucratic business regulations inhibit the development of a dynamic private sector.
Priority measures: parliamentary elections, corruption, greater government transparency, reduction of tax burden, improvement of the regulatory environment, judicial reform, simplification of the tax administration.
- Foreign Trade liberalization and Customs reform
In Trading across Borders in World Bank 2015 Doing Business, Ukraine’s rank is 154 out of 185. The most demanded measures are simplification of customs procedures, straggle against corruption on customs, and reform of customs service itself.
Deregulation:
Decrease time on business registration to 2 days, harmonization norms in constructions with EU legislation, decentralizing of construction, deregulation of land usage, fixing property rights problems, harmonized trademarks and licensing issues with international standards. In addition, it is expected to short cut the list of business activities that required licenses. Important issue is change of the system of standards. According Association Agreement with EU, Ukraine will adopted 1500 national standards harmonized with EU ones and repeal standards of former USSR that still in Ukraine.
–> Role of the business and non-governmental actors on setting reform agenda
Sources:
http://us.beyondbullsandbears.com
Bloomberg, Templeton Bond Fund Dodged Disaster Hanging Tough in Ukraine, November 24th 2015
Crisis in Ukraine, The Economist, June 4th 2015
World Finance Review, May 2015
Coface report on Ukraine